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Message from the Editors 
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular 
Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is 
twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into the 
Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and second, to 
bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their 
knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-violent 
irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort at CIWAG 
that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned academics, case 
studies, research papers, articles, and books. Our aim is to make these case 
studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of 
students preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world. 
Dr. Chris Jasparro’s case study on poaching analyzes the intricate 
web of greed and grievances that drive illicit poaching and smuggling 
networks across the continent of Africa. Jasparro blends his years of field 
research on the topic with his background as a geographer to both paint 
broad-brush pictures of how criminals profit from illicit networks and 
provide detailed recommendations on how to address these challenges. 
Classroom instructors should find the questions at the end of the case study 
a solid foundation for instruction and essay assignments. Practitioners and 
scholars focused on how criminal networks function and exploit seams and 
gaps in coverage and policy should find the recommendations a nuanced 
discussion on how to respond to this challenge. 
It is important to note two critical caveats to this case study. First, 
the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author and do 
not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, the 
Naval War College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made 
to correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible 
for the content of this case study.  
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We hope you find this case study useful, and look forward to hearing 
your feedback and suggestions for how you can contribute to the Center on 
Irregular Warfare & Armed Group’s mission here at the Naval War College. 
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I. Introduction 
Around 5:30 a.m. on 14 August 2017, gunfire shatters the 
early morning calm as terrorists launch a coordinated attack 
against a UN peackekeeping camp in Douenza, Mali. 
Heeding calls for assistance, members of Mali’s joint 
army/wildlife range anti-poaching brigade respond to the 
assault and help beat it back. Brigade member Corporal 
Souleymane Tangara is killed during the battle, along with 
eight other UN and Malian security forces personnel. A 
week later, his widow will give birth to twin daughters.  
Four days later, on 18 August, the body of 37-year-
old Gabriel Ramos Olivera, a ranger and biologist, was 
found in Chacahua National Park in Oaxaca, Mexico, a 
sanctuary for endangered leatherneck turtles and crocodiles. 
He had been shot and killed by suspected poachers. That 
same day in Brazil, three rangers in Serra da Capivara 
National Park and UNESCO World Heritage Site were 
ambushed by illegal hunters. Two rangers were wounded 
and one, Edilson Aparecido dos Santos, was killed.  
Wildlife crime, which includes poaching and trafficking, has 
emerged as a significant international security issue, sharing commonalities 
and often intersecting with other transnational and irregular security threats. 
This has led to the direct involvement of military forces and application of 
military-like approaches to combat it in affected countries, as well as the 
provision of military assistance from external countries.  
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However, wildlife crime is a highly complex phenomena with 
unique dimensions that can render military assistance ineffective or 
counterproductive if not adequately considered. Consequently, military 
assistance must be tailored to the particular threat. Commercial 
transnational poaching in Botswana, for example, is treated as a national 
security threat that the military has been tasked to combat; commercial 
poachers may be subject to a shoot-to-kill policy. Local subsistence 
poaching, on the other hand, is treated as a law enforcement and 
development issue and countered with less harsh and more nuanced 
approaches.  
The main aim of this case study is to place wildlife crime in a 
strategic context and to provide a primer on the dynamics of wildlife 
trafficking and poaching to help military personnel engaged in planning, 
designing, or participating in security cooperation and military assistance 
activities for anti-poaching (AP) and counter wildlife trafficking (CWT) 
better tailor and more effectively conduct their activities. The case begins 
with an overview of trends in wildlife crime—its emerging strategic and 
security dimensions that are providing the rationale and demands for 
military assistance and responses to combat it. This is followed by a detailed 
discussion of different modes of poaching and trafficking and their unique 
dimensions that personnel should be cognizant of in designing security 
cooperation and assistance programs in order to maximize effectiveness and 
minimize the risk of unintended negative effects. The case study concludes 
with questions that can be used to guide the development of security 
cooperation efforts and types of assistance.  
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II. Contemporary Context
Until recently, wildlife crime was rarely, outside of a few countries, 
discussed in terms of international and national security, but rather spoken 
about in the language of conservation and crime. Today, it is increasingly 
being framed as an international and national security threat, with many 
governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) worldwide 
calling for increased external military support for anti-poaching forces. The 
linking of wildlife crime with security and related calls for military 
assistance for AP/CWT have been driven by three factors: (1) the dramatic 
reduction in specific animal populations (especially elephants and rhinos), 
(2) the militarization and professionalization of poachers and the violence 
they employ, and (3) the convergence of poaching with other transnational 
crimes and, in certain places, conflict and terrorism.  
In 2013, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon stated, “Poaching and 
its potential linkages to other criminal, even terrorist, activities constitute a 
grave menace to sustainable peace and security in Central Africa. In this 
regard, I urge Governments of the subregion to consider the issue of 
poaching as a major national and subregional security concern requiring 
their concerted and coordinated action.”1 Similarly, a 2013 U.S. Executive 
Order proclaimed, “The poaching of protected species and the illegal trade 
in wildlife and their derivative parts and products (together known as 
‘wildlife trafficking’) represent an international crisis that continues to 
escalate. Poaching operations have expanded beyond small-scale, 
opportunistic actions to coordinated slaughter commissioned by armed and 
1 Ban Ki-Moon, Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the United Nations Regional 
Office for Central Africa and on the Lord’s Resistance Army-Affected Areas (New York: United 
Nations, May 2013), accessed March 2, 2018, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/297. 
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organized syndicates.” 2  In a 2014 briefing to Congress, retired Army 
general and former Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) 
Carter Ham stated, “I hope Congress and others would encourage the U.S. 
Department of Defense to take this on—not as a top mission but as a 
mission.”3  
In February 2014, 42 countries signed the London “Declaration on 
Illegal Wildlife Trade” in which the signatories agreed to, among other 
things, treat “poaching and trafficking as a serious organized crime in the 
same category as drugs, arms, and people trafficking.”4 Similarly in 2015, 
President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya announced that Kenya and Tanzania 
had “agreed to scale up cooperation in the war against terrorism, drug 
trafficking and poaching.” 5  Also in 2014, The National Strategy for 
Combating Wildlife Trafficking was released to outline U.S. strategic 
priorities and provide a roadmap for a whole-of-government approach 
across the chain of wildlife crime;6 and, with bipartisan support, the U.S. 
Congress passed the 2016 Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt (END) 
Wildlife Trafficking Act, which authorized the provision of “defense 
                                                          
2 Barak Obama, Executive Order--Combating Wildlife Trafficking (Washington, DC: White House, 
July 2013), accessed March 21, 2016, https://whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/07/01/executive-order-combating-wildlife-trafficking. 
3 Anna Mulrine, “To Combat Terror, Pentagon Should Help Fight African Poaching, Ex-General 
Says,” Christian Science Monitor, September 12, 2014. 
4 Peter Wilson, “The London Declaration’s Role in the Fight Against Wildlife Trade,” UN 
Chronicle, September 2014, accessed September 1, 2017, https://unchronicle.un.org/article/london-
declaration-s-role-fight-against-wildlife-trade. 
5 Business Daily Africa, “Kenya, Tanzania Step Up War on Poaching, Terrorism, Drugs,” October 
5, 2015, https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Tanzania-step-up-war-on-poaching/539546-
2900038-s67k6nz/index.html. 
6 The National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking (Washington DC: White House, 2014), 
accessed May 10, 2017, https://www.fws.gov/home/feature/2014/trafficking/national-strategy-
wildlife-trafficking.pdf. 
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articles, services, and training to the security forces of a country of concern 
to counter wildlife trafficking and poaching.”7  
Action on the ground has paralleled political rhetoric, in what has 
been called “green militarization,” whereby military and military-like 
“actors, techniques, technologies, and partnerships” are used in pursuit of 
conservation goals. 8  For example, in 2011 the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) deployed two companies to Krueger National 
Park. Similarly, in March 2013, Chad, Cameroon, and the Central African 
Republic initiated the Extreme Emergency Anti-Poaching Plan, which 
included mobilizing Chadian and Cameroonian military forces to fight 
poaching. Anti-poaching is also a mission for other militaries, including 
those of Botswana, Mali, Tanzania, Gabon, and Mozambique.  
Western military support against poaching has correspondingly 
become more common. For instance, British troops have deployed to train 
anti-poaching forces in Gabon, Kenya, and Malawi, and the British Army 
has even formed its own specialist anti-poaching unit.9 U.S. AFRICOM has 
trained anti-poaching forces in Chad and Tanzania10 and collaborated with 
                                                          
7 Summary: S.2385 – 114th Congress (2015-2016), accessed March 24, 2017, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/11th-congress/senate.  
8 Elizabeth Lunstrum, “Green Militarization: Anti-Poaching Efforts and the Spatial Contours of 
Kruger National Park,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 104:4 (2014), 816. 
9 Marco Giannageli, “Tartan Army Sent In to Protect Elephants from Poachers,” Express, October 
25, 2015; Adam Vaughn, “British Army Joins Fight Against Elephant and Rhino Poaching,” The 
Guardian, November 1, 2013; Ben Farmer, “New Army Specialists to Hunt African 
Wildlife Poachers and Revive Tracking Skills,” The Telegraph, August 14, 2017, 
accessed September 1, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/14/new-army-
specialists-hunt-african-wildlife-poachers-revive-tracking/ 
10 John Platt, “Elephant Poachers Have a New Problem: U.S. Marines,” Takepart, May 24, 2014, 
accessed March 25, 2016, www.takepart.com/article/2014/05/24/elephant-poachers-have-new-
problem-marines; Eric Summers, “U.S. Soldiers Team with Tanzania Rangers to Combat 
Poaching,” Army.mil , September 12, 2016, accessed August 30, 2017, 
https://www.army.mil.article/1748964/us_soldiers_team_with_tanzania_rangers_to_combat_poach
ing. 
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anti-poaching organizations in Congo.11 The U.S. Marines Corps’ Special 
Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response – Africa has 
trained Gabonese Armed Forces soldiers and park rangers in patrolling, 
mission planning, and combat marksmanship.12  
Wildlife NGOs are militarizing as well, whether in terms of 
providing military-style advising, training, and equipping or directly 
supporting or conducting anti-poaching operations, investigations, and 
intelligence. Private military corporations and former military personnel are 
also working for traditional wildlife NGOs or forming their own anti-
poaching organizations.13  
 
                                                          
11 African Parks, Update: Garamba National Park's Poaching Crisis, September 1, 2014 
https://www.african-parks.org/newsroom/press-releases/update-garamba-national-parks-poaching-
crisis 
12.Alexander Mitchell, Marines.Mil, “Gabon, U.S. Train to Fight Illicit Activity, January 2017, 
http://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/1044724/gabon-us-train-to-fight-illicit-
activity/ 
13 Alison Morrow and Susan Wyatt, “Anti-Poaching Battlefield Draws U.S. Veterans,” Military 
Times, September 27, 2015, accessed September 28, 2015, 
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/veterans/2015/09/07/anit-poaching-battlefield-draws-us-
veterans/72673584/; Darren Taylor, “Iraq War Veteran Battles Rhino Poachers in Africa,” 
VOANEWS, January 29, 2012, accessed September 27, 2012, voanews.com/a/Iraq-war-veteran-
battles-rhino-poachers-in-africa-138338229/159563.html. 




Figure 1. Volunteer anti-poaching unit member, undisclosed location, South Africa 
(photo credit: Chris Jasparro) 
 
Often missing from rhetoric and policy impetus for giving military 
support for CWT is a crucial element: 
 
an elaboration on both the precise nature of the security 
threat posed . . . [P]oaching and wildlife trafficking are 
labelled simultaneously as drivers of conflict, market 
openings for organized criminals, and facilitators of 
terrorism—often without reference to concrete cases in 
point. The result is a growing acceptance of the new 
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industrial-scale poaching and wildlife trafficking as a 
security threat without sufficient clarity on the type of 
poaching and wildlife trafficking posing the threat; the 
individuals and groups who pose this threat; or the 
communities whose security is threatened.14  
 
This does not mean strategic and security rationale for security 
cooperation do not exist. However, inadequate understanding and 
reductionist views of wildlife crime and its security implications increase 
the risks of security cooperation efforts that are either ineffective or 
counterproductive. This case study hence attempts to provide an in-depth 
and contextualized look at wildlife crime as a security threat. 
  
                                                          
14 Cathy Haenlein and MLR Smith, Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking and Security in Africa: Myths 
and Realities (Abington, UK: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 
2016), 1. 
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III. Overview of Trends 
 
A Vietnamese woman with a late-stage cancer pays $2,000 
for a vial of rhino horn powder, desperately hoping for a cure 
in a country with a cancer mortality rate of 73%, one of the 
world’s highest. Nearby, a wealthy businessman takes a 
rhino horn powder “detox” to treat a hangover from the 
previous night’s partying. In China, a man receives a set of 
ivory chopsticks for a present. Because of its combination of 
durability, carveability, and beauty, over the centuries ivory 
has acquired the status of a luxury good. (China banned 
ivory sales in 2017, the U.S. in 2016). 
 
 
Figure 2. Rhino, undisclosed location, South Africa (photo credit: Chris 
Jasparro) 
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In an African port city, an official enjoys a new car 
paid in part from bribes exacted from wildlife traffickers. In 
a rural village, a porter spends some of his income on food 
for his young children (a normal income in the area is under 
$1 a day), while down the street one of his counterparts 
spends all his earnings on beer. At the other end of the Indian 
Ocean, a criminal gang smuggles a shipment of ivory and 
other illicit goods. They will celebrate in royal style that 
night with their earnings.  
Deep in the central African bush, an anti-poaching 
unit, wary of an ambush, follows the smell of death to a 
clearing where an elephant carcass lies. Its head is defaced 
where it was shot; poachers ripped out its tusks and dug out 
the bullet in order to remove forensic evidence. A gash lies 
along the elephant’s back where its spine was slashed by an 
ax to immobilize so it could be de-husked while still 
breathing. Its severed trunk sits in the dust a few meters away 
where the poachers tossed it. 
Several hundred miles further south, a team of 
reserve management personnel on a morning survey find a 
female rhino dead, here face hacked up and a stump where 
her horn used to be. Next to her is the body of her calf, also 
killed. The reserve personnel have known, studied, and 
protected this rhino for years and keenly feel the loss. From 
the other side of the reserve’s fence, a subsistence hunter 
eyes impala he is no longer allowed to hunt. Later in the day, 
a recruiter for a local commercial ring will tempt him with 
job as a guide for a poaching team due to arrive in a few days 
from a bordering country. 
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The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates 
the value of illegal wildlife trafficking at US$10 billion to $20 billion 
annually. 15  The illegal market for tiger parts (including skins and raw 
bones) is worth an estimated US$5 million a year; only about 3,000 wild 
tigers are left, down from 100,000 at the start of the 20th century.16 Each 
year, Africa loses between 5% and 7% of its elephants to poaching. 17 
Elephants and rhinos accounted for 18% and 3%, respectively, of global 
wildlife seizures between 2005 and 2014.18 In 2013, 20,000 elephants were 
killed for ivory worldwide; and in 2014, 1,215 rhinos were killed in South 
Africa alone, versus 122 in 2009.19  
 
                                                          
15 International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime, World Bank Development Facility (New 
York: UNODC, 2013), accessed March 30, 2016, https://www.undoc.org/documents/sustainable-
livelihoods/UNODC_ICCWC_report_2013.pdf.. 
16 UNODC, The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment 
(UNODC: 2010), accessed May 1, 2017, http://unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis-
tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res/pdf. 
17 Vira Virun, Thomas Ewing, and Jackson Miller Out of Africa: Mapping the Global Trade in 
Illicit Elephant Ivory (Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Defense Studies, August 2014), 3. 
18 UNODC, World Wildlife Crime Report: Trafficking in Protected Species (New York: United 
Nations, 2016), 14.  
19 “Wildlife Trafficking,” Havoscope Global Black Market Information, accessed March 26, 2016, 
www.havocscope.com/tag/wildlife-trafficking/. 




Figure 3. Rhino Trafficking and Species Loss (credit: Riccardo Pravettoni, GRID Arendal 
http://grid-arendal.herokuapp.com/resources/7487) 
 
In addition to iconic large mammals, over 7,000 other species are 
targeted by wildlife crime; reptiles accounted for 9% of wildlife seized 
between 2005-2014, and pangolins, whose meat can fetch up to US$350 per 
kilo in Asia, 20  accounted for 5%. 21  Helmeted hornbills are poached in 
Southeast Asia for their keratin (the same material that makes up rhino 
                                                          
20 Nathan Young, “Poaching Facts,” 2017, accessed May 10, 2017, 
www.poachingfacts.com/encyclopedia/pangolin-profile. 
21UNODC, World Wildlife Crime Report: Trafficking in Protected Species (New York: United 
Nations, 2016). 
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horns) helmets. Known as “red ivory” in China,22 it can fetch up to $8 per 
gram—up to five times the cost of elephant ivory on the black market.23  
 
 
Figure 4. Wildlife Trafficking and Species Population (credit: Riccardo Pravettoni, GRID 
Arendal http://grid-arendal.herokuapp.com/resources/7487) 
 
The violence is not limited to animals, however. According to the 
Thin Green Line Foundation, over 1,000 park rangers were killed 
worldwide between 2006 and 2016. 24  Over 70% of African rangers 
surveyed by the World Wildlife Federation (WWF) claimed have faced life-
                                                          
22 Rachel Bale, “These Rare Birds Are Being Slaughtered for Their Ivory,” National Geographic 
News, March 16, 2016, accessed May 10, 2017, news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/03/160316-
helmeted-hornbill-trafficking-smuggling-red-ivory/. 
23 Doug Janson, “Spectacular Helmeted Hornbill Could Be Wiped Out by Chinese Demand for 
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threatening situations from either poachers or local communities, 25  and 
29% of rangers in Asia reported having been attacked by poachers.26 The 
bloodshed is two-way: for example, between 2008 and 2015, 220 
Mozambican poachers were killed.27  
Current trends notwithstanding, it is important to remember that 
large-scale militarized poaching is not a new phenomenon. According to 
Vira and Ewing, Africa’s first wave of contemporary large-scale ivory 
poaching was “born in war” in the 1970s and 1980s when up to 100,000 
elephants per year were being killed, many by “a wide array of African 
armies and militias seeking to feed and fund their forces.”28 Wars in central 
and eastern Africa decimated elephant populations in Sudan, Kenya, 
Central African Republic, Zaire, and Uganda. In southern Africa, poaching 
and trafficking of ivory and rhino horn from Angola, Mozambique, and 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) became institutionalized by Rhodesian and 
South African forces to fund their operations.29  
Today, however, the renewed intensification of large-mammal 
poaching, combined with a deepening intersection of poaching and wildlife 
trafficking with high levels of violence and other transnational crimes—and 
in some places conflict and terrorism—are driving calls for military 
involvement and are attracting the interest of the U.S. and other influential 
international actors. Robust protection and interdiction efforts are often the 
                                                          
25 WWF, Ranger Perceptions Africa (Washington, DC: WWF, 2016), accessed July 21, 2017, 
https://c402277.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/publications/880/files/original/Ranger_Perception_Africa_%2
8FINAL%29.pdf?1464013250 
26 WWF, Ranger Perceptions Asia (Washington, DC: WWF, 2016), accessed July 21, 2017, 
https://c402277.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/publications/861/files/original/Ranger_Perception_Survey_%2
8Asia%29.pdf?1456408489 
27 Alec Russell, “Rhino Poaching: Inside the Brutal Trade,” Financial Times, October 2, 2105, 
accessed September 1, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/f71d53ea-67b3-11e5-97d0-1456a776a4f5 
28 Varun Vira and Thomas Ewing, Ivory’s Curse: The Militarization and Professionalism of 
Poaching in Africa (Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Defense Studies, 2014), 8. 
29 Ibid., 8. 
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only viable emergency options in areas where poachers count among their 
ranks militarized actors such as former non-state combatants, insurgents, 
and corrupt military personnel and employ military-grade weaponry and 
tactics against the generally lightly armed and thinly spread ranger, law 
enforcement, and border forces who have traditionally assumed wildlife 
protection roles. Militaries are often the only actors with the training, 
weaponry, and numbers who can either confront heavily armed, militarized 
poachers or provide the training, material, and/or enabling support that 
paramilitary ranger and law enforcement services need.  
Furthermore, the line between wildlife crime and other threats can be 
hard to distinguish, and wildlife protection units are also sometimes called 
upon to support other security operations. For instance, in July 2017, 
unidentified armed men attacked a group of rangers and journalists in 
Congo’s Okapi Wildlife Reserve, killing four rangers and one porter. 
Rangers participated in a joint mission with Congolese army troops to find 
and recover the killed and missing persons. 30  In 2017, Mali formed a 
combined wildlife ranger-army brigade to combat elephant poaching, “a 
necessary pairing for protecting wildlife in this hostile territory, regularly 
crisscrossed by offshoots of Al Qaeda and bandits,” both of which engage 
in poaching.31 Since its inception, the brigade has endured IED strikes and 
fought off ambushes; on August 14, 2017, a brigade member was killed as 
the unit responded to calls from UN peacekeepers whose base in Douentza 
                                                          
30 Details on July 14 Attack in Okapi Wildlife Reserve, July 20, 2017, accessed, September 1, 2017, 
https://www.okapiconservation.org/details-on-july-14-attack-in-okapi-wildlife-reserve/ 
31 Mark Rivett-Carnac, “Mali’s Desert Elephants, on Edge of Annihilation, Get a Fighting Chance,” 
New York Times, October 29, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/29/world/africa/mali-
elephants-gourma.html 
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was being attacked by jihadists. Two attackers and a UN peacekeeper were 
also killed.32  
 
  
                                                          
32 Naomi Larssson,.“Three More Rangers Killed in a Deadly Month Around the World for Wildlife 
Defenders,” The Guardian, August 23, 2017, accessed March 14, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/aug/23/rangers-killed-deadly-month-wildlife-
defenders 
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IV. Strategic and Security Dimensions of Wildlife Crime 
   
 The trends discussed above provide the basis for viewing wildlife 
crime as a threat to U.S. strategic interests and international security, due to 
its effects on governance and development, homeland and border security, 
health, and convergence with other security issues such as transnational 
crime, conflict, and terrorism. Wildlife crime’s impacts in these areas 
intersect with several strategic objectives and priority actions outlined in the 
most recent U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), including securing U.S. 
borders, combating biothreats and pandemics, dismantling transnational 
criminal organizations (and their subsidiary networks), building capable 
partner security forces, and strengthening rule of law. They also intersect 
with specific regional military objectives, such as to “improve the ability of 
[African] security services to counter terrorism, human trafficking, and the 
illegal trade in arms and natural resources” in Africa and to “reduce crime 
and corruption by supporting local efforts to professionalize police and 
other security forces . . . and disrupt illicit trafficking” in the Western 
Hemisphere.33 
 
A. Governance and Development 
The lucrative nature of wildlife crime can act as a “force multiplier” 
to the overall impacts of transnational and organized crime on governance 
and development. The combined effects are concerning because “as 
organized crime eats away at governance and stability, countries can 
become locked in a vicious circle where social trust is lost and both rule of 
                                                          
33 Donald Trump,.National Security Strategy of the United States (Washgington, DC: The White 
House, 2017). 
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law and economic growth are undermined.”34 Widespread and systemic 
corruption facilitate wildlife crime, while its lucrative nature in turn 
provides further opportunities for corruption, which can weaken the 
legitimacy of governments, undermine rule of law, and contribute to 
instability and state fragility. According to the U.S. National Intelligence 
Council, wildlife crime “exacerbates corruption by introducing high-value 
illegal products to influential individuals along the supply chain,” 35 
including politicians, law enforcement, and military personnel. This 
corruption reduces government effectiveness, civil society engagement, and 
public trust in the state.36 Criminal syndicates pay off judges and security 
officials and operate on a “take-the-money-or-the-bullet” approach, causing 
officials to look the other way.37  
A recent investigation by the Economist revealed that some 
Tanzanian soldiers rented out weapons to poachers while police personnel 
escorted illegal ivory shipments.38 Rangers, particularly underpaid ones, are 
especially vulnerable to corruption. Sean Willmore, president of the 
International Ranger Federation, says that corruption across the world “is 
as bad as I have known it. If rangers are not getting enough remuneration 
they can be corrupted. In Cambodia, for example, rangers were being paid 
$100 per month and that was cut to $30 per month. . . . What do you do if 
                                                          
34 Ibid, 60. 
35 National Intelligence Council, Wildlife Poaching Threatens Economic Security Activities in 
Africa (Washington DC: National Intelligence Council, 2013), accessed June 20, 2016, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=744406, 5. 
36 Ibid, 5. 
37 Maurice Oniango and Andrew Ochieng, “Corruption and Poaching, the Tusk at Hand,” 
Africa.com, June 13, 106, accessed June 20, 2016www.africa.com/corruption-poaching-tusk-hand/. 
38 “Big Game Poachers,” The Economist, November 8, 2014, accessed 21 June 2016, 
www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21631202-claims-links=between-politicians-
poachers-merits-further-investigation-big. 
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you want to feed your family?”39 Pratik Patel, CEO of the African Wildlife 
Trust, posits that 50% of African wildlife rangers may be corrupt.40 
On the other hand, wildlife can be an important economic and 
development resource.41 Wildlife tourism (which often combines with and 
helps generate other tourism activities) is growing globally by 10% per 
annum, with about half of all trips taking place in Africa.42 International 
tourism to Africa was valued at least $34.2 billion in 2013, and wildlife 
tourism comprised the largest part of this figure. Tourism alone accounts 
for 12% of Kenya’s GDP.43  
Large-scale poaching can have both direct and indirect effects on 
food security through over-hunting and by contributing to environmental 
change. Wildlife and megafauna help maintain biodiversity and ecosystems 
that provide crucial resources, such as viability of watersheds and 
grasslands. Over-hunting of seed-dispersing animals such as primates and 
other animals in tropical rainforests can alter forest dynamics and add to the 
deforestation that is exacerbating climate change. 44  Further, protein 
supplies from bushmeat in African forest regions are expected to decline by 
                                                          
39 Oliver, Milman, “Ranger Corruption, Impeding Global Fight Against Poaching,” The Guardian, 
March 27, 2013, accessed 19 June 2016, https://www.the 
guardian.com/environment/2013/mar/27ranger-corruption-impeding-fight-poaching. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Note that development of wildlife tourism can also lead to conflict if pursued without regard to 
local stakeholders; see, for example, L.R. Douglas and K. Alie, “High-Value Natural Resources: 
Linking Wildlife Conservation to International Conflict, Insecurity, and Development Concerns,” 
Biological Conservation 171 (2014), 274. 
42 World Tourism Organization, Towards Measuring the Economic Value of Wildlife Watching 
Tourism in Africa – Briefing Paper (Madrid: UNWT 2014), 6 and 16. 
43 Philip Muruthi, “The Economics of Africa’s Wildlife,” World Economic Forum, March 3, 2015, 
accessed May 12, 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/03/the-economics-of-africas-
wildlife/.  
44 Bushmeat Crisis Task Force, Bushmeat: A Wildlife Crisis in West and Central Africa and Around 
the World (Washington, DC: BCTF, 2009), accessed June 22, 2015, 
www.bushmeat.org/sites.default/files/BCTFBRIE.pdf.  
Jasparro: Wildlife Trafficking and Poaching 
24 
 
80% by 2050.45 Food insecurity can in turn drive migration and political 
instability.46  
B. Homeland and Border Security 
After China, the U.S. is the second largest market in the world for 
wildlife products, but as much as 30% of imports may be illegal. 47 
Criminals trafficking wildlife routinely compromise the integrity of U.S. 
borders and those of allied states. For instance, nearly 25% of the 50,000 
illegal shipments of wildlife and wildlife products seized between 2005 and 
2015 at U.S. points of entry originated from Latin America. Such trafficking 
provides pathways along which other illicit products and pathogens could 
enter the U.S.  
 
C. Infectious Disease 
Wildlife trading and trafficking provides pathways for disease 
transmission that have caused disease outbreaks in humans and livestock, 
disrupted trade and ecosystems, and cost “hundreds of billions of dollars of 
economic damage globally,” according to the Wildlife Conservation 
                                                          
45 P. Lindsey et al., Illegal Hunting and the Bush-meat Trade in Savannah Africa: Drivers, Impacts, 
and Solutions to Address the Problem (New York: Panthrea/Zoological Society of London/Wildlife 
Conservation Society, 2012), 14. 
46 Hunger Without Borders, The Hidden Links Between Food Insecurity, Violence, and Migration 
in the Northern Triangle of Central America (Washington, DC: World Food Program/International 
Organization for Migration/Organization of American States, 2015), accessed March 1, 2017, 
documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/liaison_offices/wfp27754.pdf?_ga=1.123237
065.33748124.1485965097) 
47 Darryl Fears, “Overwhelmed U.S. Port Inspectors Unable to Keep Up with Illegal Wildlife 
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Society. 48  For instance, reptiles and amphibians often carry salmonella 
(74,000 cases annually in the United States) while monkeys and rodents can 
carry herpes B, monkeypox, and rabies.49 The H5N1 influenza virus (“bird 
flu”) has been found in eagles from Thailand smuggled to Belgium via plane 
travel. 50  Outbreaks of HIV, Ebola, and SARS have all been linked to 
bushmeat hunting and wildlife trading.51 Scientists from the Smithsonian 
have identified a possible link between declining populations of large 
wildlife such as rhinos and elephants and a rise in rodents and fleas that 
vector zoonotic diseases, diseases that jump from animals to humans—
which account for about 60% of human pathogens.52  
 
D. Threat Convergence 
The shift from treating wildlife crime as a conservation issue to 
treating it as a broader security issue is largely related to concerns that it is 
intersecting with other forms of organized crime and may be becoming a 
source of terrorist and conflict funding. Since wildlife crime generally poses 
relatively low risks versus potential gains, “the appeal of engagement by 
                                                          
48 William Karesh, Robert Cook, and James Newcomb, “Wildlife Trade and Global Disease 
Emergence,” Emerging Infectious Disease 11:7 (2005), 1000.  
49 “Facts About the Exotic Pet Trade”, accessed March 2, 2017, www.animalplanet.com/tv-
shows/fatal-attractions/lists/facts-exotic-pet-trade 2009/2010.  
50 Steven van Borm, “Highly Pathogenic H5N1 Influenza Virus in Smuggled Thai Eagles, 
Belgium,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 11:5 (2005). 
51 William Karesh, Robert Cook, and James Newcomb, “Wildlife Trade and Global Disease 
Emergence,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 11:7 (2005), 1001. 
52 Hilary Young et al., “Declines in Large Wildlife Increase Landscape Level Prevalence of 
Rodent-Borne Disease in Africa,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 11:19 (2014), 
7036. 
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organized crime groups not traditionally associated with wildlife appears 
strong.”53  
Wildlife crime has become integrated with broader transnational 
criminal dynamics as specialized actors intersect with logistical and 
transport chains that deal in multiple types of crime. For example, Latin 
American drug trafficking organizations have hid cocaine in animal 
products, including live specimens, and trade wildlife products or drugs as 
a form of money laundering.54 Abalone smuggling has provided an entry 
for Chinese organized crime and drug trafficking syndicates in southern 
Africa. 55  Chinese gangs have since diversified into trafficking of other 
wildlife products such as ivory, rhino horn, and shark fins, as well as drug 
trafficking and smuggling of migrants and contraband goods.56  
 
                                                          
53 Cathy Haenlein and MLR Smith, Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking, and Security in Africa: Myths 
and Realities (Abington, UK: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 
2016), 90. 
54 Kevin, Xie, “Crime Gone Wild,” Harvard International Review, August 27, 2015, accessed 11 
May 2017, hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=11741. 
55 Christopher Jasparro, Research Report Environmental Threats to Security, Stability, and U.S. 
Interests in Southern Africa: Opportunity Knocks:Time for a Comprehensive Region Defense 
Environmental International Cooperation and Environmental Security Assistance Strategy, 
November 2011, for USAF Institute for National Strategic Studies/US Army Environmental Policy 
Institute. 
56 P. Gastrow, “Main Trends in the Development of South Africa’s Organized Crime,” African 
Security Review 8:6 (1999); STRATFOR, Organized Crime in South Africa, July 18, 2008,accessed 
September 29, 2009, http://www/stratfor.com/analysis/organized_crime_south_africa. 




Figure 5. Abalone Trafficking (credits: Image: Initium Media; Translation: Oxpeckers 
Investigative Environmental Journalism) 
 
Wildlife trafficking in southern Africa shares routes with drugs, 
weapons, and other contraband within the region as well as across the Indian 
Ocean and to and from Europe and South America.57 Instances of wildlife 
and narcotics trafficking intersecting have been detected in numerous 
                                                          
57STRATFOR, Organized Crime in South Africa, July 18, 2008, accessed September 29, 2009, 
http://www/stratfor.com/analysis/organized_crime_south_africa. 
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places, including Zambia.58 In Botswana, intelligence sources developed 
for anti-poaching purposes have in turn yielded intelligence about other 
organized criminal activities,59 while in northern Uganda ivory is just one 
commodity among a “portfolio of goods” that local smugglers and move 
across long-established trading networks.60 
While there is a general consensus about convergences between 
wildlife crime and other transnational crime,61 recent media attention and 
political rhetoric has tended to focus on linkages between wildlife crime, 
conflict, and terrorism. However, these linkages are more problematic and 
contested. “The argument that ivory plays a key role in financing terrorism 
has become embedded in public discourse in both Western and African 
states,” according to one author,62 yet globally most wildlife crime does not 
involve terrorists or insurgents. According to the UNODC, most elephant 
poaching in Africa occurs in countries at peace; if insurgents killed all the 
elephants in countries where they are active (encompassing about 4% of the 
continent’s elephant population), they would net only between $10 million 
and $40 million at current prices.63  
Although convergence between wildlife crime, conflict, and terror 
may not be globally extensive, it does occur and can be significant in 
                                                          
58 Times of Zambia, “DEC Arrests Illegal Ivory Trader,” Africa News, March 17, 2008; S. Kimaro, 
“Woman Nabbed at Airport Trying to Smuggle Ivory Out to China,” This Day, July 13, 2009. 
59 Author field interviews: non-attribution interviews conducted by author with BDF and security 
officials in Gaborone, May 2005.  
60 Kristof Titeca, “Illegal Ivory Trade as Trasnational Organized Crime? An Empirical Study into 
Ivory Traders in Uganda,” British Journal of Criminology, 2018, 11. 
61 Cathy Haenlein and MLR Smith, Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking, and Security in Africa: Myths 
and Realities (Abington, UK: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 
2016), 77. 
62 Rosaleen Duffy, “Al-Shabaab and Ivory (1),” Marjan Centre for the Study of War and the Non-
Human Sphere, September 26, 2015, cited in Cathy Haenlein and MLR Smith, Poaching, Wildlife 
Trafficking, and Security in Africa: Myths and Realities (Abington, UK: Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016), 58. 
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Jasparro: Wildlife Trafficking and Poaching 
29 
 
particular locales. According to Interpol and the UN, several non-state 
armed groups are raising funds by targeting a diverse range of wildlife 
resources, including “ivory, rhinoceros horn, tiger pelts, [and] shatoosh 
wool from the Chiru or Tibetan antelope.” 64  Examples of such groups 
include the Lord’s Resistance Army (elephant poaching), Sudanese 
Janjaweed (elephant poaching), various Congolese militant groups 
(elephant, hippopotamus), Mozambican National Resistance (elephant, 
rhino), Bangladeshi separatists and allied Al-Qaeda affiliates (ivory, rhino 
horn, tiger pelts), and armed groups in northern Mali, including Al Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb (elephants). 65 INTERPOL estimates that armed 
groups in sub-Saharan Africa obtain between $4 million and $12 million 
from ivory annually.66 
Generally, the convergence between wildlife crime and terrorism 
and insurgency is not one of simple financing but rather a dynamic in wider 
conflict, illicit, or gray-area economies. For instance, drug traffickers 
(including members of various armed groups) in Burma’s borderlands 
engage in timber, gem, and wildlife trafficking,67 while local populations 
participate in illegal mining, logging, and wildlife trafficking. 68  These 
economies can link disparate armed groups, terrorists, and criminals across 
the geographic scale from the local level to international markets via 
transnational distribution networks. The existence of these markets can 
provide an economic disincentive for conflict resolution—in turn, helping 
to sustain ungoverned spaces. Conversely, allowing wildlife and other 
                                                          
64 C. Nellemann, R. Henricksen, P. Raxter, N. Ash, and E. Mrema, E. (eds.), The Environmental 
Crime Crisis: Threats to Sustainable Development from Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife 
and Forest Resources (Nairobi: UNEP/GRID Arendal, 2014), 48. 
65 Ibid., 48. 
66 Ibid., 8. 
67 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Enabling War and Peace: Logs, Gems, and Wildlife in Burma and 
Thailand (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2015), 20. 
68 Ibid, 25. 
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forms of natural resource trafficking to perpetuate can be used to achieve 
initial buy-in to peace processes, although at the expense of longer-term 
political, economic, and environmental sustainability.69  
  
  
                                                          
69 C. Nellemann, R. Henricksen, P. Raxter, N. Ash, and E. Mrema, E. (eds.), The Environmental 
Crime Crisis: Threats to Sustainable Development from Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife 
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V. Dynamics of Wildlife Crime 
Most media coverage of wildlife crime focuses on poaching and the 
slaughter of iconic large mammal species, such as elephants and rhinos. 
However, the dynamics and conduct of wildlife crime are much broader, 
varied, and complex than commonly portrayed, and they must be 
understood in order to intelligently craft strategies and security cooperation 
efforts. There are two main levels of poaching and wildlife crime—
subsistence and large-scale commercial—and they exist on a continuum, 
with varying grades and nuances between them.  
 
A. Subsistence 
Subsistence poaching primarily involves the hunting and trapping 
either of edible animal resources, better known as “bushmeat,” or animal 
products used for cultural or ceremonial practices, such as leopard skins for 
ceremonial dress in southern Africa or animal parts for making drums and 
medicine in Tanzania.70 These products are either consumed directly by 
hunters, their families, and communities or sold for cash in local or regional 
markets. Although illegal subsistence hunting has attracted less media 
attention than large-scale commercial poaching, it is widespread. In the 
Central Africal Republic alone, 59,000 tons of bushmeat are illegally 
harvested each year; 2,078 tons of illegal bushmeat are confiscated annually 
in Tanzania. It is a key factor in shrinking wildlife populations, and is the 
primary driver of decline in some cases.  
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The primary motive for subsistence poaching is basic survival—
sustenance, cash, or barter. Poverty is the primary driver, especially in 
places where alternate sources of protein do not exist. In rural central Africa, 
for example, large-scale animal husbandry is not environmentally viable, 
but livestock is a traditional source of savings and insurance, and alternate 
lines of credit and saving are limited. 71 Thirty percent to 80% of rural 
household protein thus comes from hunting.72 In central Africa cities, just 
4% of protein comes from wild sources, but rapidly growing urban 
populations throughout the continent are driving an absolute increase in 
demand. 73  Similarly, in the Amazon basin, bushmeat is an important 
element of food security for rural households.74  
Bushmeat preferences generally result from a combination of 
ecological (what is available) and cultural (traditional food tastes, 
symbolic/cultural meaning, etc.) factors. Therefore, subsistence poaching 
targets a wide range of species. In Africa, this may include large mammals 
such as elephant, primates (gorilla, chimpanzees, monkeys), various 
antelope species, bush pigs, cane rats, bats, pangolin, crocodile, lizards, 
guinea fowl, and other bird species. Demand, however, can change in 
response to economic, demographic, and cultural trends. Overhunting and 
destruction of ecosystems that reduce populations of larger species such as 
antelope can lead to reliance on smaller species such as rodents.  
                                                          
71 Bushmeat Crisis Task Force, Bushmeat: A Wildlife Crisis in West and Central Africa and Around 
the World (Washington, DC: BCTF, 2009), accessed June 22, 2015, 
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72 P. Lindsey et al., Illegal Hunting and the Bush-Meat Trade in Savannah Africa: Drivers, 
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Infrastructure development and land use changes are increasing 
opportunities and incentives for bushmeat poaching. In the Congo Basin, 
road construction and the fragmentation of forests has made access easier 
for hunters and facilitated the transport of bushmeat to urban markets, while 
an influx of loggers, who have more money to spend than locals, has 
increased demand and consumption of bushmeat. 75  Increasing demand, 
profitability, and commercialization is now eroding cultural constraints and 
taboos on bushmeat hunting among some groups. 
Bushmeat poaching is generally conducted with low-tech and 
inexpensive methods such as shotguns, muzzle loaders, bows and arrows, 
hunting dogs, and traps and snares. Trading and sale of bushmeat follows 
along informal and formal lines. For instance, subsistence hunters may 
provide meat directly to their families and fellow villagers or pass meat via 
informal social exchange networks to friends and family in urban areas.76 
Commercial hunters generally supply meat via middlemen and wholesalers 
to market stalls, restaurants, or specific customers. In some areas, hunters 
may be provided with weapons and ammunition by middlemen or 
wholesalers.77 Hunting “rights” may be granted by village headmen or by 
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B. Commercial Wildlife Crime 
 At the other end of the wildlife crime spectrum—and of more 
concern to international security officials and military forces—is organized 
commercial poaching and trafficking involving transnational criminal 
networks and flows. This often involves military-style tactics and weaponry 
as well as traps, snares, and poison. Organized criminal wildlife trafficking 
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can penetrate and morph with small-scale poaching, particularly when 
bushmeat becomes a luxury or prestige item in urban areas or among 
diaspora communities overseas. Subsistence poachers can also be recruited 
by organized criminal syndicates as trackers, guides, and porters.  
 The conduct of organized commercial wildlife crime can vary 
depending on location and according the commodities being poached and 
trafficked. Similarly, the level of organization and centralization varies, 
from highly organized syndicates to semi-organized, ad hoc, opportunistic, 
and shifting arrangements. For example, wildlife crime spiked in Mongolia 
after an economic crisis in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, when many people were driven to engage in subsistence hunting and 
poaching. Poaching then took on a dual local/transnational structure, geared 
toward household consumption as well as profit. Trafficking of wildlife 
products initiated with local hunters and moved via middlemen who shipped 
contraband using small traders, particularly to China. 78  
 Generally, there are four common components to organized wildlife 
crime: poaching (i.e., supply); transit; facilitation (bribery, weapons 
procurement, coordination, documents, etc.); and sale (i.e. demand). It is 




 Commercial poaching may be opportunistic or commissioned. An 
example of opportunistic commercial poaching is when animals with 
commercially valuable parts such as ivory are killed for food or as pests, 
and high-value parts then are sold into commercial chains. The numbers and 
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mix of personnel used in commercial poaching varies according to 
geography, species, and enforcement measures. Poaching may also be 
seasonal. For instance, the wet season is preferred in parts of Africa because 
bad roads restrict the mobility of anti-poaching forces. In other places, 
poachers prefer the dry season because animals are forced to congregate at 
watering spots.79 In parts of South Africa, commercial bushmeat poaching 
increases ahead of holiday weekends to supply braais (barbeques). 
Large mammal poaching usually involves teams of people with the 
following specific tasks and skills: trackers and guides, porters, cutters 
(those who butcher carcasses), shooters, and sometimes security elements. 
Poaching teams generally range from five to 20 people, depending on the 
area, the targeted species, and anticipated anti-poaching measures. Even 
poaching for smaller animals has the potential to escalate in terms of 
violence and weaponry. In Indonesia, organized criminal groups have 
penetrated tropical forests to hire locals to hunt hornbills,80 reportedly with 
AK-47s loaned out by local police.81  
According to wildlife officials, poaching teams in Kenya may consist of 
youths led by experienced poachers employing military-grade weapons 
such as AK-47s, M16s rifles, and G3 battle rifles.82 Rhino poaching teams 
in South Africa’s Krueger National Park prefer large-caliber rifles such as 
.458s, .375s, .308s, and .303s with sound suppressors for taking down 
animals. The Czech C7-550 has emerged as a particular favorite, with 
security elements carrying AK-47s, R1s, and G3s for protection against 
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anti-poaching teams. Poachers are paid based on their function in the team. 
By mid-2014, water carriers could earn $1,500 per kilogram of rhino horn 
obtained, with shooters earning up to $5,000 per kilogram. Both South 
African and Mozambique nationals (some with dual citizenship) conduct 
the poaching. Tactics constantly evolve to evade anti-poaching teams. For 
instance, teams may enter the park legally as tourists with weapons hidden 
in specially designed vehicle compartments; when rhinos are spotted, the 
shooter may be dropped off, with teams returning later to pick up the kill.83  
Similarly, commissioned ivory poaching teams operating in the Kariba 
area of Zimbabwe prefer high caliber weapons such as .458s, .375s, and 
.303s for shooting animals and AK-47s or Chinese SKS rifles for security. 
Zambian poaching syndicates using local guides are the major players. In 
response to anti-poaching efforts, teams have become smaller. Previously 
as large as 15 or more, they now generally consist of a shooter, a guide 
and/or a tracker and two or three porters, along with the recent addition of 
a one-man security element. Some semi-opportunistic ivory poaching is 
conducted by locals with connections to middlemen who can fence the ivory 
and supply ammunition.  
In Botswana, commercial poaching is generally conducted by cross-
border groups employing locals as guides and porters, who have operated 
as far as 150 kilometers from the border. Six-man teams including one or 
two shooters have employed sophisticated and adaptable techniques such as 
tracking, weapons caching, establishing observation and listening posts, 
ambushing, creating operational deception, using light aircraft from remote 
strips, and separating sites, keeping camps, weapons, and kills separate.84  
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Trafficking uses many pathways and markets with their own 
dynamics,85 which makes generalization difficult, even within the market 
for a single species. While the following discussion and examples provide 
only a basic understanding of some major markets, they highlight the types 
of issues that should be considered in actual planning.  
The transport of poached goods occurs along trafficking networks of 
varying sophistication and organization. Routes are fluid and adjust in 
response to enforcement efforts and changing transportation infrastructure, 
such as new road construction. For example, in eastern and southern Africa, 
there are both specialized organized networks as well as ad hoc shifting 
networks of local and transnational criminal gangs, middle men, and 
facilitators engaged in the ivory trade.  
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Figure 7. Ivory Trafficking (credit: Riccardo Pravettoni, GRID Arendal, http://grid-
arendal.herokuapp.com/resources/8027) 
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East Africa is the gateway for maritime shipments to Asia, accounting 
for 70% of reported seizures between 2009-2013. 86  Ivory moves along 
routes used for both licit and illicit goods and is generally moved overland 
by road in vehicles ranging from large trucks to motorcycles,87 sometimes 
via lakes such as Victoria with Malawi or Uganda as a staging point, and 
sometimes along the coast by dhow to east African ports such as Mombasa, 
Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, and Pemba, and then on to Asia in shipping 
containers. It is often hidden among other products or in secret 
compartments.88  
A lesser volume moves overland to major airports and to Asia via 
commercial air. Another route sees ivory from Central Africa moving out 
via West African ports in countries such as Nigeria and Togo.89 En route to 
destinations in Southeast and East Asia, ivory-bearing shipping containers 
often transit ports in the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, and Vietnam.90  
 
iii. Facilitation 
Commercialized wildlife crime involves much more than killing 
animals and transporting the booty. Considerable facilitation is needed to 
organize and connect suppliers with consumers and to ensure effective 
transport to destination markets. A diverse and fluid array of actors and 
arrangements are involved. Poaching teams must be contracted, armed, 
supplied, and connected to middlemen. Wildlife products must be 
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transported within origin countries and then across borders, often via 
multiple transit modes, to distributors and sellers in market destinations.  
Corruption, along with weak judicial systems, is often the lubricant on 
which the system flows. For example, half the wildlife cases in the Central 
African Republic’s legal system are undercut by corruption, while three of 
the seven ivory traffickers arrested in Cameroon between July 2013 and 
August 2014 were released before completing their sentences, and only one 
of the seven received the minimum required penalty of at least a year in 
prison.91  
Because most protected species and products can be traded legally to 
varying extents, permits obtained through fraud, corruption, and forgery 
often cover the movement of contraband.92 Bribes can facilitate movement 
through checkpoints, ports, and borders. In one case, a Chinese middleman 
paid $20,000 in bribes to gain access to Dar es Salaam’s port to deliver 81 
tusks to Chinese naval officers whose vessel was in port. He was caught 
only because an underpaid supplier tipped off authorities.93  
Weapons may be surplus from past or nearby conflicts, loaned to 
poachers from facilitators, rented from local communities, or leaked or 
loaned from military forces. Ranger or military units sometimes conduct 
poaching and facilitate transport themselves. In South Africa, for instance, 
growing numbers of police, rangers, and park officials have been arrested 
for crimes related to rhino poaching and horn trafficking, with 11 policemen 
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arrested in 2015 alone.94 Poachers also have attempted to infiltrate anti-
poaching units.  
 The operations of the Xaysavang Network provide a mini-case study 
of how the four elements of the illegal wildlife trade come together and the 
difficulty of combating what is a murky and adaptive business. Turtles, tiger 
parts, pangolins, snakes, and ivory from Africa and Asia have been seized 
en route to companies registered to Lao national Vixay Keosavang, the 
network’s alleged leader, who has been called the Pablo Escobar of wildlife 
trafficking. One tactic employed was the use of pseudo-hunters to apply for 
hunting permits in South Africa as a cover for rhino poaching. At one stage, 
Vietnamese nationals and female Thai prostitutes were used; the actual 
shooting was done by South Africans. Once this ruse was uncovered, 
Eastern European tourists were recruited instead.95 Rhino horns were then 
shipped as “trophies” from South Africa to trans-shipment points in Laos 
and Thailand and on to markets in Vietnam and China.96  
Although this particular operation was broken up in 2012, the network 
is still believed to be active, and Keosavang is still at large despite a $1 
million reward for his arrest being posted by the U.S. government. 97 
Information about the organization and its operations is cloudy and hard to 
ascertain. Network affiliates are currently suspected to be active in South 
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Africa, Mozambique, Thailand, Laos, Malaysia, Vietnam, and China; 98 
documents issued by the Laotian government are alleged to provide cover 
to some companies associated with the network.99  
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VI. Unique Aspects and Challenges Posed by Wildlife 
Crime 
 
The four components around which wildlife crime are arranged—
poaching, transit, facilitation, and sale—parallel most types of transnational 
criminal trafficking and provide the basis for convergence with other types 
of criminal and security threats. However, these similarities can make it 
easy to overlook a number of challenges that are either particular to wildlife 
crime or that have distinctive dimensions when they occur in the context of 
wildlife crime, and thus must be taken into consideration when designing 
and executing AP/CWT and supporting programs. 
 
A. Wildlife Crime Is About People, Not Just Animals 
Although community support and buy-in has proven to be a force 
multiplier and critical element in achieving sustainable and effective anti-
poaching in many venues,100 the fact that wildlife crime is ultimately about 
humans is often overlooked. Sensationalized international media coverage 
and the advocacy campaigns of some NGOs focus on the plight of 
“helpless” animals, ignoring the human aspect. Such animal-centric views 
can contribute to several interrelated challenges. 
First, animal-centric perspectives, especially where species face rapid 
decline, can lead to an imbalance towards supply-side (i.e., enforcement at 
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the source) approaches. This can lead to dehumanization of poachers and 
local communities as “bad” people killing “helpless” animals and intensify 
the negative effects of militarization and threat conflation (which will be 
discussed later). Without addressing governance problems and consumer 
demand in wealthier countries, anti-poaching enforcement becomes “a 
game of whack-a-mole”101—where one problem is solved, another pops up. 
It must be recognized that although supply-side and militarized approaches 
may be necessary in some cases, they are not solutions. Retired South 
African general Johan Jooste, who was appointed by South Africa National 
Parks to devise an anti-poaching strategy explains, “We are forced into 
[militarization] to buy time . . . [but] the high demand for rhino horn cannot 
be defeated by force.”102  
Second, focusing on wildlife protection without equal consideration to 
local communities can create or exacerbate a negative triangular dynamic 
between land use/tenure disputes, human-wildlife conflict (HWC), and 
displacement of human communities. HWC may occur when animal 
populations increase due to the intended or unintended effects of successful 
wildlife protection methods or when the ability of local communities to 
manage the effects of wildlife populations on their livelihoods changes. 
This might be because of state-imposed regulations on how local 
communities interact with wildlife, thereby exposing them to challenges 
such as loss of crops or livestock. For instance, farmers and herders trying 
to protect their livelihoods in some parts of Kenya injure and kill more 
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animals per year than poachers do.103 Animals are also killed in retaliation 
for killing livestock or people. For example, in Kenya’s Amboseli National 
Park, the rate of ivory poaching has declined, while retaliatory killings have 
increased since 2011.104 
Land-use disputes arise when the goals of conservation, wildlife 
tourism, and agriculture conflict, especially when they result in disputes 
over land tenure, ownership, or user rights. Land-use issues and HWC can 
also lead to displacement of local populations. Conservation displacement 
has two main causes: socioeconomic, when adverse effects on peoples’ 
livelihoods prompt voluntary movement; and physical, or the removal of 
communities from protected areas. 105  Exclusion of local communities, 
displacement of local communities, or failure to adequately address the 
needs of local communities can undermine the legitimacy of host 
governments and external partners. Further, because contemporary 
conservation areas in many parts of the world are based either in old royal 
hunting preserves or colonial-era conservation plans, these issues can 
provide fodder to information and ideological campaigns waged by non-
state adversaries by reviving or reinforcing anti-colonial, anti-state 
narratives. 
Colonial conservation grew out of romantic traditions opposed to 
modernization and a rational scientific approach that aimed to “manage 
nature for human enjoyment and health.” 106  Much contemporary 
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conservation thinking and media/policy attention on combating wildlife 
crime is subconsciously derived from this colonial approach, which can lead 
to an ahistorical view of the problem by external actors and states. It is 
important to remember that hunting by European colonialists played a role 
in the advancement of imperialism. The subsequent enactment of colonial 
game laws and reserves were based on the desire for security rights and 
resources for colonial elites and the state, as well as on the Western 
scientific and cultural desire to protect species for posterity.107 This was 
usually done without regard for and to the exclusion of local communities.  
Not surprisingly, local communities often have different historical 
memories that can trigger and be used to foster resistance to anti-poaching 
and conservation measures. The creation of the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park, straddling the borders of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and 
Mozambique, was justified by state actors on the basis of wildlife 
conservation, tourism, and addressing past conflicts; however, local 
residents slated for relocation question the project’s legitimacy due to 
memories of past displacements.108 Similarly, tensions are growing in parts 
of Kenya between local herders under stress from drought, population 
growth, land shortages, and other factors and large ranches and wildlife 
conservancies owned by people of European descent. These tensions are 
being (re)framed by some through the lens of old anti-colonial narratives, 
in which land was seen as being stolen from locals and given to white 
farmers.109 In Nepal, the “commodification” and protection of wildlife for 
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ecotourism became a symbol of “outside domination,” which in turn 
generated sympathy for Maoist insurgents.110  
Community-security force tension is common enough that more Asian 
and African wildlife rangers report life-threatening encounters with local 
communities than with poachers.111 Consequently, care must be taken that 
military support to conservation and wildlife protection does not play into 
narratives that can undermine community support or host-government 
legitimacy, potentially bolstering information operations conducted by 
insurgents and extremists. 
  
B. Poachers, Traffickers, and Animals Move: Balloon and 
Reverse Balloon Effects 
 
The war on poaching can produce “balloon effects” in which 
suppression and interdiction in one place can displace poaching and 
trafficking somewhere else. For example, the rhino poaching outbreak in 
South Africa as of this writing (spring 2018) is partly the result of efforts to 
protect rhinos in Zimbabwe by moving them to protected zones in South 
Africa. Similarly, ivory traffickers try to avoid interdiction by shifting 
shipments through places with weak port and airport controls such as Togo 
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and Mozambique in order to avoid enhanced security in places like Dar es 
Salaam.112  
Unlike with drug production or trafficking in fixed natural resources 
such as timber and minerals, wildlife trafficking does not involve an 
inanimate commodity but one that is both sentient and mobile. This can lead 
to a kind of “reverse balloon effect,” whereby successful protection efforts 
in one locale can result in animals moving to “safe” areas, which in turn can 
either lead to species overpopulation, environmental degradation, and new 
or intensified HWC—and in turn undermine support for even broadly 
popular wildlife protection efforts. For example, Botswanan anti-poaching 
efforts have gained accolades, garnered considerable public respect, and 
enhanced the reputation of the Botswana Defence Force. 113  However, 
rebounding elephant populations in Botswana have precipitated an increase 
in HWC and somewhat weakened public support for anti-poaching 
measures.114 (Unfortunately, animals do not always appreciate the fact that 
they are being protected, either. Rangers surveyed in Africa and Asia report 
more life-threatening encounters with wildlife than with people.115) 
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Figure 8. Chobe River without elephants, Nambia (photo credit: Chris Jasparro) 
 
 
Figure 9. Chobe River elephant herd, Botswana (photo credit: Chris Jasparro) 
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C. Militarization  
 As discussed earlier, the pace and violence of wildlife crime in 
relation to the limited capabilities and capacity of many traditional wildlife 
enforcement agencies has driven demand for and in many cases necessitated 
military or military-like responses and capabilities. Militarized responses 
include employment of military forces and/or tactics in anti-poaching; 
providing traditional ranger and law enforcement units with military 
training and equipment; and involvement of private military corporations 
and former military personnel in supporting and training anti-poaching 
forces and conservation NGOs. Such responses have had mixed effects. 
While in some instances these measures have “resulted in high numbers of 
arrests and seizures of ivory, weapons, and ammunition, in some cases 
civilians have faced increased threats from firearms and violence related to 
anti-poaching activity.” 116  Both practitioners and researchers have 
cautioned against the pitfalls of applying over-militarized approaches to 
anti-poaching and CWT.117 However, most of these critiques have been 
limited to issues of weapons and tactics and certain technologies rather than 
non-kinetic and non-high-cost assistance that military forces can provide 
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such as first aid training, human rights education, planning and strategy 
development, and so forth. 
 According to the Game Rangers Association of Africa, 118  some 
areas of concern around the involvement of foreign military personnel 
training wildlife personnel and rangers include the following:  
• Differences between military and ranger/law enforcement cultures; 
• Lack of appreciation for the operating environment and specialist 
anti-poaching skills that require detailed knowledge of ecosystems, 
wildlife behavior, and local communities and cultures; 
• Inappropriate assistance relative to the threat or legal frameworks: 
legal restrictions and use-of-force principles often differ 
considerably from wartime rules of engagement, while in some 
cases park rangers have been trained in tactics such as long-ranger 
sniper training that would result in their arrest if employed; 
• Provision of technology and equipment that is too expensive, high-
tech, or difficult to maintain in situations where basic equipment 
such as boots, first aid kits, and uniforms are lacking. 
 
Integrating technology such as drones into AP operations has been 
successful in some cases. However, many countries affected by poaching 
have environmental constraints such as dense forest cover, dust, or sand that 
make drones impractical. Further, the capabilities required for effective 
drone operations, such as thermal imaging and sophisticated processing and 
analytical software, and the cost of expertise and infrastructure required to 
support these capabilities (as much as $500,000 per year) are often 
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prohibitive, especially when ground-response forces may lack basic 
supplies like canteens and boots.119  
Militarized approaches may increase the risk of collateral damage. And 
collateral damage combined with heavy-handed approaches can damage the 
community relations that are so important for anti-poaching, challenge the 
rule of law, and undermine government legitimacy. Shootings of poachers 
in Krueger National Park have strained relations between local 
communities, rangers, and the government to the point where people start 
saying about park rangers, “You are a killer, you’re killing our children out 
there, you’re killing our husbands . . .”120 Mozambicans killed by anti-
poaching forces often receive a hero’s burial and have stories and songs 
written about their exploits, while members of some South African and 
Mozambican border communities question whether the lives of animals are 
more valuable than those of citizens.121  
When applied against subsistence hunting, which is closely tied to 
people’s basic livelihood and cultural traditions, overly militarized 
approaches may increase or exacerbate security problems and even increase 
illegal hunting. This is especially the case in areas where local populations 
have few alternatives to subsistence hunting, where they are marginalized 
from the benefits of wildlife protection, and where governments have 
limited legitimacy.  
Militarized approaches may also reinforce an overreliance on supply-
side enforcement at the expense of broader measures, which can be 
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compounded by militarization’s media appeal. According to some 
conservationists, this can lead to a bias toward resourcing enforcement 
because politicians, donors, and the public see images of anti-poaching 
operations and equipment as “sexy,” while donors “like to see boots on the 
ground and technology.”122 
Assigning military units to anti-poaching operations may shift assisting 
or partner national forces from more traditional military roles such as 
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, disarmament 
demobilization and reintegration, or security sector reform. It may detract 
from other strategic priorities of the assisting and/or partner nations or divert 
forces away from targeting the roots of poaching in a particular area, such 
as fighting rebels or performing post-conflict stability operations, to 
targeting its symptoms. In cases where armed groups involved in a conflict 
are poaching, focusing limited resources on defeating the armed groups or 
ending the conflict may be a better path than focusing on anti-poaching.  
Boosting the capability of military forces to combat poaching may 
deprive ranger and law enforcement forces of much-needed resources or 
exacerbate imbalances between military and civilian security forces. For 
instance, one unintended consequence of the effectiveness of the Botswana 
Defence Force in containing poaching in the early 2000s was to erode 
incentives for improving the capabilities of Botswana’s police and wildlife 
departments.123  
A final dimension of militarization is the increasing involvement of non-
state military actors into anti-poaching/CWT as local private military 
corporations, foreign military veterans, and NGOs take on military/security 
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functions. With most conflicts and disasters, NGOs may seek support from 
and/or to coordinate with military forces but maintain their neutrality and 
independence, while private military corporations tend to operate as 
specifically military auxiliaries. However, in the anti-poaching arena, many 
NGOs are developing their own military capabilities and even conducting 
their own intelligence, security assistance, and field operations. NGOS 
directly recruit and employ former military and intelligence personnel and 
work with military contractors and suppliers; and some foreign military 
veterans have set up their own anti-poaching NGOs or consultancies.124  
The quality and competence of these organizations and individuals are 
highly uneven. Some are highly skilled and understand the nature of the 
threat and operating environments, but others are “fly-by-night trainers 
cashing in on the poaching crisis,” according to the Game Rangers 
Association of Africa, often abetted by media that “portrays military 
‘heroes’ as the answer” to poaching, with sensational headlines such as 
“Iraq War Veteran Battles Rhino Poachers in Africa.”125 This can lead to 
fraught relations with host-nation governments and wildlife organizations; 
one group called Veterans Empowered to Protect African Wildlife was 
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www.gameranger.org/news-views/media-
releases.html?utm_content=buffer8c209&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_ca
mpaign=buffer; Darren Taylor, “Iraq War Veteran Battles Rhino Poachers in Africa,” VOANEWS, 
January 29, 2012, m.voanews.com/a/Iraq-war-veteran-battles-rhino-poachers-in-africa-
138338229/159563.html. 
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ousted from Tanzania in 2015 after its inflammatory language about killing 
poachers came to light.126 
 
D. Threat Conflation 
It is clear that the practice of poaching has become militarized in many 
cases and that wildlife crime often converges or intersects with other 
transnational and irregular security threats. However, there is danger in 
overly conflating these connections in counterproductive ways that 
accelerate militarized responses and negative side effects. Threat conflation 
is fueling a “poachers-as-terrorists” narrative 127  that glosses over the 
differences between types of poachers and can allow poachers to be viewed 
as legitimate targets of war, “making their deaths not only permissible but 
necessary to save threatened wildlife.”128  
In most cases, wildlife crime is not or is only marginally related to 
terrorist and conflict funding. Although there may be merit in pursing 
AP/CWT in support of a broader CT or COIN campaign in certain areas, 
attacking wildlife crime through a primarily CT/COIN lens would in most 
cases represent a misunderstanding of the problem and lead to ineffective if 
not counterproductive results. This misfire would extend beyond combating 
wildlife crime and encompass broader strategic objectives such as 
establishing good governance and countering radical ideologies. As 
discussed above, application of excessive force, heavy-handedness, and 
exacerbating human-wildlife and land tenure conflicts can erode the 
legitimacy of host-nation governments and forces while reinforcing anti-
                                                          
126 Jon Anderson, “Nonprofit VETPAW Kicked Out of Tanzania,” Military Times, May 7, 2015, 
www.militarytimes.com/story/veterans/2015/05/07/reports-nonprofit-vetpaw-kicked-out-of-
tanzania/70963970/ 
127 Rosaleen Duffy, “War, by Conservation,” Geoforum 69 (2016), 240. 
128 Ibid., 243. 
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Western neocolonial narratives and detracting from the effectiveness of 
core CT/COIN and post-conflict stability operations.  
Furthermore, viewing hunters and poachers strictly as criminals, 
insurgents, or terrorists who should be deterred or neutralized may negate 
other opportunities. Many poachers have been “flipped” to become 
effective anti-poaching rangers, trackers, and informants.129 Participatory 
or community-based anti-poaching approaches have also demonstrated 
potential if properly conceived.130 
Hunters have also played important roles as community protection 
forces or as COIN auxiliaries. For instance, in northern Nigeria, local 
hunters have turned against Boko Haram; 131  and in the late 1990s, 
traditional Kamajor hunters in Sierra Leone played an important role in 
defending local communities and defeating Revolutionary United Front 
rebels. Today former Kamajor fighters (some who are also former poachers) 
serve as anti-poaching rangers in Sierra Leone.132  
Conversely, disputes between governments and indigenous peoples can 
potentially alienate useful allies for anti-poaching or even create tensions 
within governments. In Botswana, for example, wildlife and police officials 
have been accused of abusing San hunters and gatherers, 133  while the 
                                                          
129 For examples see Delia and Mark Owens, The Eye of the Elephant (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1992); Remy Scalza, “Preserving Culture, Protecting Wildlife,” New York Times, 
November 3, 2013, 8 tr; B.J. Kelso, “Hunting for Conservation,” Africa Report 38:4 (1993), 68-71. 
130 For a discussion of the prospects and pitfalls of community-based anti-poaching, see Frances 
Masse, Alan Gardiner, Rodgers Lubilo, and Martha Ntlhaele Themba, “Inclusive Anti-Poaching,” 
SA Crime Quarterly, June 2017, 19-27. 
131 Dionne Searcy, “Hunters Now Track Militants’ Prey in Nigeria: Boko Haram,” New York 
Times, May 14, 2017, 6. 
132 Aurele Marrier d’Unienville, “Sierra Leone’s Ex-Civil War Fighters Battle Poachers,” Al 
Jazeera, April 10, 2016, accessed May 12, 2017, 
www.aljizaeera.com/indepth/features/2016/03/sierra-leone-civil-war-fighters-battling-poachers-
16032115725113.html. 
133 Sandy Gall, The Bushmen of Southern Africa (London: Pimlico, 2002). 
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Botswana Defence Force, which was not implicated in the San controversy, 
has effectively used San trackers to support its anti-poaching operations.134  
 
  
                                                          
134 Christopher Jasparro, Research Report Environmental Threats to Security, Stability, and U.S. 
Interests in Southern Africa: Opportunity Knocks – Time for a Comprehensive Region Defense 
Environmental International Cooperation and Environmental Security Assistance Strategy, 
November 2011, for USAF Institute for National Strategic Studies/US Army Environmental Policy 
Institute, 12.  
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VII. Areas for Security Cooperation and Military 
Assistance  
 
A Land Rover on a game drive bounces along a rutted road 
towards the banks of the Chobe River in northern Botswana, 
when a truck carrying a squad of armed soldiers suddenly 
appears from around a bend. In many parts of Africa, coming 
across armed men in the remote bush would be a cause for 
alarm, but these are professional soldiers of the Botswana 
Defence Force returning from an anti-poaching patrol. The 
encounter passes with friendly waves and smiles.  
A few kilometers down the road, the Land Rover 
comes across several large elephant herds. Across the river 
and international border lies the Caprivi Strip, where 
elephants enjoy less effective protection and only a single 
elephant roams. 
The BDF’s anti-poaching mission began in 1987 in 
response to a rise in commercial poaching related to conflicts 
in neighboring countries, as wildlife personnel were unable 
to cope with the increased rate of poaching and militarized 
opponents. In the early 1990s, the U.S. Defense Department 
provided boats and light aircraft to the BDF, and U.S. 
Special Forces provided training to BDF commandos. 
USAID provided long-term assistance with implementing a 
community-based natural resource management program.  
While the experience of Botswana suggests that 
military assistance and security cooperation in support of 
anti-poaching can be effective and provides lessons worth 
studying, it is important to recognize that this is a rare 
success story. The military piece is just one part in a unique 
institutional-political-legal-geographic-cultural-
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developmental context. However, its approach was born in 
the last wave of poaching, and the new wave that is sweeping 
across Africa is encroaching upon Botswana, which will 
necessitate changes in strategy if it is to be combatted 
effectively. HWC conflict, treatment of the indigenous San 
people, and political rivalries between the national 
intelligence service, BDF senior officers, and the 
Department of Wildlife’s intelligence sections are ongoing 
controversies that must be addressed. 
 
 
Given the complex challenge wildlife crime presents and the 
potential pitfalls it poses, what can be done to determine which assistance 
might be the most appropriate and effective? 
The first step is to determine what kind of security cooperation and 
military assistance should be provided—if any at all. The complexity and 
variability of wildlife crime and the diversity of potential partner nation 
contexts, forces, and capabilities precludes the development of a uniform 
template or standard suite of approaches that can be devised.  
A tailored approach is required. This must involve an initial 
recognition that wildlife crime is a complex phenomenon. Reductionist 
narratives and logic chains such as “poacher equals bad” and “animal equals 
good” must be eschewed, as must threats conflated without nuance or 
context such as “poaching funds terrorism, so poachers are terrorists; 
therefore, poaching is a CT problem.”  
An in-depth assessment should include an analysis of the strategic 
and operational environment, which includes ecosystems, wildlife, local 
culture, key stakeholders and actors, the political and legal environment, 
and the partner nation needs versus strategic and program objectives and 
potential risks. Specific consideration should be given to questions such as 
the following: 




1. What type of wildlife crime is being targeted, and what is the wider 
context in which it is embedded? 
2. What are the overarching strategic and operational objectives of 
assisting and host nations for CWT (i.e., protecting animals, 
countering other threats via CWT, etc.)? 
3. Are integrated CWT strategies or approaches already in place by 
countries providing and receiving assistance that additional efforts 
can support?  
4. Who are the key stakeholders and participants (communities, 
agencies, NGOs, businesses, contractors, etc.) involved in CWT? 
Are any key members being left out? What is the level of community 
involvement? 
5. What forms of corruption could threaten the efficacy and/or the 
operational security of the cooperation effort? Can safeguards be put 
in place?135 
6. What are the partner nation’s existing capabilities and needs, 
especially those specific to anti-poaching? Is the proposed 
assistance appropriate for the partner nation in terms of cost, 
sustainability, and level of technology? 
7. What is the legal milieu for CWT in the partner nation (i.e., relevant 
laws, authorities for use of force, rules of engagement)? 
8. Who will (and should) be the recipients of assistance? What types 
of organizational culture must be considered (i.e., ranger, military, 
etc.)? 
                                                          
135 For a comprehensive approach to countering wildlife related corruption, see WWF and 
TRAFFIC Wildlife Crime Initiative, Strategies for Fighting Corruption in Wildlife Conservation: A 
Primer, http://www.traffic.org/general-
reports/wci_strategies_for_fighting_corruption_wildlife_conservation.pdf 
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9. Is the assistance appropriate for the legal milieu (laws, security force 
authorities, rules of engagement)? 
10. What are the risks of unintended consequences and blowback at 
local, national, regional, and strategic levels? What are the risks of 
over-militarization and escalation? What are the risks of CWT 
efforts working at cross-purposes to other priorities and actions? 
 
Once a decision has been made to provide assistance, numerous 
avenues can be pursued, depending upon the particular situation. Although 
varying partner-nation needs and the unique contexts of wildlife crime 
prevent uniform and formulaic approaches, best practices from the field 
suggest that assistance with strategy development and intelligence-led 
operations, fusion, and analysis should be considered in most cases. 
Experience has shown that the correct strategy is crucial to success.136 
However, many park, reserve, and country-level AP/CWT efforts are 
fragmented, tactically focused, and reactive. The expertise of the U.S. and 
other Western military in designing strategic planning processes and 
developing comprehensive strategies (and the subsequent doctrine and 
capability assessments) could be applied to combating wildlife trafficking 
and related threats. 
Multisource intelligence-led operations have also been shown to be 
highly effective in CWT.137 The experience gained by the U.S. and other 
                                                          
136 Wayne Lotter and Krissie Clark, “Community Involvement and Joint Operations Aid Effective 
Anti-Poaching in Tanzania,” Parks, March 2014, 24. 
137 Lindy Taverner and Peter Scott,“Wildlife Protection: The Emergence of Intelligence-Led 
Policing,” Africa Geographic (blog), March 3, 2017, accessed April 3, 2018, 
https://africageographic.com/blog/wildlife-protection-emergence-intelligence-led-policing/; 
Elephant Crisis Fund Special Report 2017, accessed April 2, 2018, 
https://wildnet.org/sites/default/files/ECF%202017%20Special%20Report_final.pdf; Patricia 
Raxter and Rory Young, “Drones Can Curb Poaching, but They’re Much Costlier Than 
Alternatives,” National Geographic Changing Planet (blog), May 23, 2015, accessed April 4, 
2018, https://blog.nationalgeographic.org/2015/05/23/drones-can-curb-poaching-but-theyre-much-
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Western militaries in the application of intelligence-led approaches to 
combat irregular, transnational, and networked opponents over the past 
several decades are particularly relevant to AP/CWT. Especially valuable 
are collection of information derived from combat tracking, sensitive site 
exploitation and crime-scene processing at the tactical level, and its fusion 
with operational and strategic-level intelligence. Assistance with combat 
tracking, site exploitation, and crime-scene investigation along with 
intelligence fusion, analysis, dissemination, and sharing could help improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of tactical operations, develop a better 
intelligence picture of operating environments, expose criminal networks 
and corruption, and (where convergence does occur) provide insight into 
the operations and networks of other transnational criminal and armed 
groups. 
 Militaries could offer numerous other forms of assistance if the 
situation warrants. At the tactical level, there is often a need for training and 
assistance in basic weapons skills and care, tactical shooting, movement and 
counterambush techniques against militarized opponents, detecting and 
countering IEDs, first aid, casualty evacuation, patrol planning, land 
navigation and map reading, exploiting and processing sites for evidence 
and intelligence, hotspot mapping, and meteorological observation and 
recording. Material needs often include uniforms, boots, canteens, packs, 
vehicles, radios, sleeping bags, tents, and basic infrastructure such as base 
camps and housing.  
At the operational and strategic levels, common needs include 
assistance and advice in the areas of weather forecasting and reporting; 
                                                          
costlier-than-alternatives/; Wayne Lotter and Krissie Clark, “Community Involvement and Joint 
Operations Aid Effective Anti-Poaching in Tanzania,” Parks, March 2014; Angela Anderson, 
Modern Intelligence Measures to Combat Animal Poaching: A Conservation and Counterterrorism 
Strategy, MS thesis (Erie, PA: Institute for Intelligence Studies, Mercyhurst University, 2014). 
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command, control, and communications; construction and operation of 
operations centers; operational planning; counterintelligence and anti-
corruption; counter-threat financing; small-boat operations and port 
security; conducting and coordinating multi-actor operations (state 
agencies, NGOs, etc.); vetting military contractors and veterans; logistics 
and mobility; developing community-based security forces; and 
professionalization, defense institution building, and security sector reform. 
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VIII. Conclusion
Wildlife crime is an expanding and increasingly violent international 
problem whose strategic profile and importance is growing. Demand for 
military and security assistance for CWT is thus expected to rise as well. 
Proving such assistance can have sound strategic reasons that can mutually 
benefit assisting and host nations.  
However, wildlife crime is complex, variable, and has unique 
dimensions; it is embedded in wider environmental, market, political, 
cultural, governance, and (often) conflict dynamics. Thus, there are 
significant risks that programs could be ineffective at best, squandering 
resources that could be more effectively applied to other challenges, and, at 
worst, produce significant unintended negative consequences. Security 
cooperation planners should therefore carefully assess and design programs 
and measures of success based on a thorough understanding of the type and 
context of the threat, the operating environment (natural, political, legal, 
cultural), the strategic objectives, all stakeholders, and existing strategies (if 
any), as well as risks.  
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